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This paper empirically analyses the impact of institutions, both formal and informal, on 
innovation performance of sampled countries at different stages of development. Data of 72 
sampled countries on Research and Development Expenditures, numbers of article published, 
human capital, trade openness, internet users are collected from United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
and World Bank database.  Formal and informal institutions indexes are constructed using data 
from Country Risk Guide and The World Value Survey (WVS). Fixed effect and System 
GMM technique are used to estimate the dynamic relationship between innovation 
performance and institutional indexes. The study finds positive significant effect of institutions 
on innovation in case of aggregate sample of developed and developing countries. However, 
the effects of formal institutions are more significant in case of sample of developed countries, 
while in developing countries informal institutions are found more effective than formal 
institutions in affecting innovation performance. The results also show that both formal and 
informal institutions are supplementary to each other in case of developing countries. 
Therefore, it is suggested that focus should be given to informal institutions. Moreover, 
collective initiatives be encourage in developing countries to have diverse ideas from different 
sectors of the countries. In addition, developing countries should initiate collaborative research 
projects with technologically advanced countries research and education institutions so as to 
learn from each other’s ideas and experiences. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Institutions are considered as main drivers of Innovation [Aghion and Howitt 
(1992); Grossman and Helpman (1990)]. However, in the knowledge-based economy, 
some of the features of each society influence the ability of an economic system to adapt 
and translate the innovative efforts into development of new ideas. Institutions are 
defined as the rules of the game in society. In other words, institutions are humanly 
developed constraints that shape human interaction [North (1990)]. It consists of both 
formal and informal institutions. The former means constitution, law, rules and regulation 
put in place by the government, while the latter means values, norms, honesty, and 
religiosity which promote cooperative behaviour in society that ultimately result in the 
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development of society. Empirical studies indicate that differences in innovative 
performance of countries are due to diversity in institutions [Sattar and Mahmood (2011); 
Tebaldi (2013)] but studies undermine the role of informal institutions. 
Informal institutions such as values and norms (proxies of informal institutions) 
contain work ethic which results in cooperative behaviour leading to sharing of 
knowledge and experience that ultimately generates new ideas and innovation [Lesser 
(2000); Lucas Jr and Moll (2011)]. Similarly, hierarchies often need new ideas and 
proposals for the introduction of new brands in the market and if workers cooperate by 
sharing their ideas, it would result in the introduction of innovative products in the 
market. This implies that norm of accepting hierarchies most likely encourage innovation 
within firms. Most of the prominent growth economists consider the flow of knowledge 
between individuals, firms and regions to be the main sources of innovation [Romer 
(1986); Lucas (2010)]. Innovation is defined as the generation of new ideas resulting 
from social interaction between workers, aimed at solving production related problems at 
workplace. 
Studies on innovation recognised that differential in innovation performance 
among countries of the world is due to differences in research and development [Romer 
(1990); Grossman (1991)]. But the creation of new knowledge and ideas is not only the 
result of activities undertaken in laboratories aimed at solving technical production 
related problems or development of new product design by specific technical experts. It 
can also be generated when economic agents interact with one another in search of 
knowledge and ideas [Lucas Jr and Moll (2011)]. 
This paper analyses the impact of institutions, both formal and informal, on 
innovation performance of countries that are at different stages of development.1  The 
current study is different in many respects from the existing studies. Tebaldi and Elmslie 
(2013) analysed the impact of formal institutions on innovation while ignoring informal 
institutions. Similarly, Sattar and Mahmmod (2010) studied the impact of intellectual 
property rights on innovation while missing informal institution’s role in innovation. 
Lucas Jr and Moll (2011) highlighted the role of time spent in social interaction by 
focusing on how individuals allocate time optimally between the production of final 
goods and in search of knowledge activities. But they did not analyse the impact of 
informal institutions which promote cooperative environment in which workers interact 
with co-worker in search of knowledge and solution to problems related to production. 
This paper is different from Lucas in the sense that it examines the effect of institutions 
(as the institutions create an environment conducive to innovation) on generation of new 
ideas using technological change model. Romer (1990) developed Technological Change 
Model which states that new ideas are generated by researchers working in laboratories 
motivated by monopoly profit. Moreover, the model assumes that the cost of new ideas 
declines as the society accumulates more ideas represented by the number of new 
product. Further, the model assumes that the number of new ideas depends on the number 
of workers in Research and Development sectors. But the model ignores that ideas can be 
 
1This paper tries to analyse the impact of institutions, both formal and informal institution on innovation 
performance of countries lying in different income groups. Following World Bank, countries are classified in different 
income groups such as low income countries, lower-middle income countries, middle income countries and high 
income countries group. Further low and lower-middle income countries are combined and named the group as 
developing countries while middle and high income countries constitute developed countries.  
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developed during social interactions among workers at the time when they face 
production related problems and share knowledge and experiences. This paper extends 
Romer (1990) model by incorporating the effect of informal and formal institutions on 
the generation of new ideas and innovation using sample of panel countries including 
developed and developing countries. 
 
2.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The basic theme of this paper is that within a firm, whenever workers face any 
problem related with production at workplace, they resort to getting help from their 
colleagues. If workers have social value or the worker has social links with other 
workers, they would be able to get help from their colleague in solving problems arising 
at the production point. Therefore when they discuss the problem encountered, they will 
find new methods (at least new for these workers) to solve the problems. As a result of 
sharing of knowledge, new intermediate input (new ideas, new method of production) 
would introduce which increase the efficiency of final goods production. Thus sharing of 
knowledge among workers within organisation would help in generation of new 
production process (new ideas and innovation) which would help in pushing upwards 
production frontier of the firm/industry and economy as whole. This logical relationship 
between institutions and innovation is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Fig. 1.  Conceptual Framework 
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the channels through which formal institutions (here considered 
only intellectual property right) affect economic growth. In this paper, we follow Tebaldi 
(2008) who has shown theoretically that formal institutions have a positive effect on 
innovation. We have incorporated his idea in order to see whether formal institutions 
would be better in the presence of informal institutions or not?  
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3.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
The new growth theory suggests that generation of new ideas depends on persons 
engaged in research and development activities and the existence of a stock of knowledge 
[Romer (1990); Aghion and Howitt (1992)]. The skilled or educated workers also spend a 
fraction of available time on exchange of ideas, solving production and market related 
problems, and thus generate new ideas [Rupasinga, et al. (2006); Lucas (2008)]. 
Growth economists have used formal institutions explicitly as determinants of 
innovation, ignoring informal institutions, which are often considered more important 
than formal institutions. According to Arrow (1962), formal institutions are not sufficient 
to eliminate risk and uncertainty arising in business activities, particularly invention, as 
the moral factor limits their potential. Informal institutions create a cooperative working 
environment in which workers interact with other workers in search of information, 
knowledge and ideas that facilitate the creation of new ideas. To incorporate informal 
institutions, this paper assumes that individuals devote a fraction 𝑢𝑠 of their time to social 
activities such as, helping other co-workers and exchanging ideas with other colleagues 
and workers. This non-market activity is described by social capital production, given 
below 
 ][])[][(][ tStHtuPtS s
  … … … … … (1) 
Where “P” is the productivity parameter of social capital, u[t]s H[t] is the time spent in 
discussing, helping and jointly solving production-related problems, which is only 
possible when the workers follow informal institutions. Equation (1) states that existing 
social capital (proxy of informal institutions) may have a positive effect on generation of 
current social capital.  
Knowledge is the accumulation of ideas and ideas are produced by people/workers 
discussing production-related problems while working with machines or technology. This 
idea is incorporated in the knowledge production function by explicitly introducing the 
effect of informal institutions such as values and norms, trust, honesty and religiosity 
which are supposed to promote the culture of sharing of ideas and knowledge (improve 
existing social capital) among co-workers that would help in generation of new ideas. 
This paper also incorporates formal institutions as input in the production of ideas. 
Formal institutions such as intellectual property rights provide an incentive to undertake 
innovative activities as it restricts diffusion of knowledge without legal permission. The 
production function of new ideas is 
 ][][])[][(][][ tTtStHtutAtA A

 … … … … (2) 
Where  is spillover effect of existing stock of ideas,  indicates the effect of existing  
informal institutions in generation of new ideas, u[t]A H[t]=(1–u[t]y – u[t]s) H[t] time 
allocated to development of new idea   and  denote the effect of formal institutions. Here 
u[t]A H[t] are the total working hours which a worker spends in R&D sector, therefore the 
paper use t  in place of u[t]A H[t] for simplicity. Since the above equation is non-linear 
and cannot be estimated as it is. Therefore, rewriting Equation (2) in discrete form as 
 Institutions and Innovation  301 
 



  TSAA ttt )( 11  … … … … … … (3) 
Now taking logarithm of sides, we have   
New ideas = ln (Ai,t) = ln  +  ln Ai,t–1 +  ln i,t–1 +  ln Si +  ln Ti + vi,t  
Rewriting the above equation, 
New ideas = ln (Ai,t) = 0 +  ln Ai,t–1 +  ln i,t–1 +  ln Si,t +  ln Ti,t +  i + i,t (4) 
where subscript i = 1,2,3,… … … and t = 1,2,3,… … … represent country and time 
period respectively. Where i,t unobservable country specific effect and i,t is white noise. 
Ai,t–1
 
is the initial stock of ideas across countries (initial value of Articles published in this 
case), Ai,t
 
 denote the numbers of article published in country 𝑖 during period t, i,t–1 is 
the total time spent in R&D sectors ( number of skilled labour force employed proxies 
with human capital), ln Si,t is logarithm of informal institutions measures and ln Ti,t 
denoted logarithm of formal institutions measures. 
Since the true measure of formal and informal institutions is unknown,  
standardised measures of these variables are used which are mostly cited in the literature. 
This paper uses indices of informal and formal institutions which may assume zero and 
negative values, in which case logarithmic transformation is not possible.  Therefore, Tˆ  
(Formal institutions index) and Sˆ (Informal institution index) are used instead of ln Si,t 
and ln Ti,t.  This paper adopts the aforementioned procedure parallel with Acemoglu, et 
al. (2001) and Hall and Jones (1990). 
Including matrix of control variables Xi,t and rewriting the fixed effect panel 
regression equation of innovation as 
tiitititi XTSAAIdeasNew ,1,1,0,
ˆˆlnln)ln(    (5) 
The coefficient of informal institutions is expected to have a positive sign as 
informal institutions are conducive to sharing of knowledge and experience that result in 
the creation of new ideas. In a working environment where workers are paid according to 
their contribution (if the worker reap full benefits of their innovative activities), the 
workers would put more effort to generate new ideas, so the expected sign of formal 
institutions is positive. Similarly, time spent in research and development sector proxies 
with the number of researchers, skilled workers employed (human capital) also expected 
to have a positive sign. So far the effect of existing stock of ideas and knowledge is 
considered; it can be positive (already accumulated stock of ideas helps in the generation 
new ideas) or negative (development of new knowledge becomes difficult in the presence 
of already accumulated knowledge). Literature shows that research and development 
expenditures have a positive effect on innovation [Romer (1990); Acs and Audretsch 
(2005)]. Therefore research and development expenditure is included as input into 
innovation/knowledge production function with the expected positive sign. 
Traditional growth regressions carry problems of endogeneity, measurement error 
and omitted variable bias [Acemoglue (2001)]. In this case, the problem of endogeneity 
may arise due to the reason that institution variables both formal and informal are 
correlated with explanatory such as human capital and the stock of knowledge, initial 
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level of institutions. Moreover, institutions change with time, so they are contemporarily 
correlated with other variables of the model.  In the presence of these problems, OLS 
estimates are biased because of the unobserved relation between omitted variables and 
the explanatory of the regression equation. 
In growth literature, Two Step Least Square method (2SLS) is often used to 
address the problems of endogeneity and error of measurement which require finding of 
appropriate instrument for endogenous variables. In this paper, formal and informal 
institutions are endogenous as they depend on others factors such as earlier institution, 
ethnicity, religiosity, colonisation and existence of norm and values in society.  In 
addition, dynamic growth and innovation model given in  Equation (4) also carries 
problem of endogeneity as the lagged value of dependent variable  is correlated with the 
residual [Nickell (1981)]. To tackle the problem of endogeneity, system GMM is used to 
estimate dynamic model of innovation given in Equation (5). 
This paper uses a panel data set of 72 countries over the period of 1980-2014. 
The selection of sample is based on data availability and prevalence of difference in 
informal institutions, formal institutions and the difference in innovation 
performance of the sample countries. The overall sample has been divided according 
to different stages of development i.e. the sample is divided into Low income, lower 
middle income, upper middle income and high income level following World Bank 
classification. Further low income countries and lower middle income countries are 
combined into a separate group called developing countries while the last two are 
combined to frame group of developed countries. 
The literature on innovation shows patents granted as an indicator of innovation 
[Schmookler (1966); Griliches (1979); Griliches (1984); Romer (2002)] but the problem 
with the patents granted is that every new idea is not necessarily granted a patent. 
Moreover, the process of registering patent is cumbersome which results in failure of 
registering ideas [Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002)]. Also, all the patents are not of the same 
quality. Therefore, in this paper, the number of articles published is used as an indicator 
of innovation following Castellacci and Natera (2011). Articles published is used as 
dependent variable in different specifications of the innovation model. As discussed 
above, innovation depends on R&D Expenditure; already accumulated stock of 
knowledge, formal and informal institutions and control variables such as Religion, 
Settler mortality, Ethnic diversity, corruption and income inequality. 
This study uses data on institutional variables collected from the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) which is widely used in growth and institutional related studies. Literature 
shows that researchers have used all components of the index or taken a few components or 
even a single component best suited to the objectives of their study.  Knack and Keefer (1995) 
used a composite index of institutional quality by using five indicators which are  (i) Rule of 
law; (ii) Corruption in government;  (iii) Bureaucratic quality; (iv) Risk of expropriation of 
assets by the government; and (v) Repudiation of contract by the government. Rodrik (2000) 
uses only bureaucratic quality, Mauro (1995) employs only corruption and Sala-i-Martin 
(1997) uses only the rule of law, and so on. Papaioannou (2009) developed an institutional 
quality index by simply taking the sum of all the twelve indicators included in the ICRG 
dataset. This paper developed Formal institutions index by taking simple average of six 
indicators of institutions including (i) Government Stability; (ii) Investment Profile; (iii) 
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Control over Corruption; (iv) Law and Order; (v) Democratic Accountability;  and (vi) 
Bureaucracy Quality [ Papaionnou (2009)]. 
The literature on informal institutions shows various proxies of informal 
institutions such as social capital, generalised trust [Narayan and Pritchett (1999); 
Krishna and Uphoff (1999)], Crime rates, Gini index and corruption index as a 
measure of informal institutions. To measure informal institutions, researchers have 
used either single measure [Putnam (1993); Grootaert (1999); Narayan and Pritchett 
(1999); Krishna and Uphoff (1999)] or take few measures together [Rose (1999); 
Brehm and Rahn (1997); Doh and Acs (2010)].  As the above measures of informal 
institutions  are likely to be correlated; therefore the present paper construct s 
informal institutions index by taking a simple average of trust variable, happiness 
index and friendship index taken from CANA database [Castellacci and Natera 
(2011)]. The data on the aforementioned variables is collected from World Bank, 
World value Survey, Country Risk Guide and CANA database [Castellacci and 
Natera (2011)]. Detail of Variables and data sources are given in Appendix 1.  
 
4.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
Fixed effect estimation results show that lag articles published (innovation 
indicator) shows a positive effect on innovation thereby supporting the RD growth model 
prediction that past discoveries help in present discoveries [Romer (1990)]. The 
coefficient of RD expenditure also shows a positive significant effect on innovation 
which implies that innovation and research and development expenditure are positively 
related (see Tables 1, 3, and 6). 
The result of fixed effect methods shows a positive significant effect of both 
formal and informal institutions on innovation performance of both developed and 
developing countries (see Tables 3 and 6). The coefficient interaction shows a positive 
significant effect on innovation but becomes insignificant when time effects are 
introduced (see Table 3). The coefficient of internet users shows significant positive 
effect on innovation which implies that development of information technology increased 
the size of the market, strengthened formal institutions in protecting copy right and made 
sharing of knowledge accessible. However, the coefficient of internet users is positively 
insignificant in case of developing countries (see Tables 3 and 5). 
The positive significant effect of informal institutions on innovation implies 
that innovations increase at the workplace where social values prevail i.e. where 
norm of cooperation, respect, trust and mutual help prevails. This empirical 
conclusion supports the hypothesis that researchers/worker in cooperative 
environment would be more productive. The significant positive coefficient of 
interaction term of institutions indicates that informal institutions support formal 
institutions in effecting innovative performance of sample countries. It also implies 
that informal institutions such as respect, honesty and religiosity restrict people from 
violation of property rights leading.to increase in generation of new ideas. The 
empirical results concerning formal institutions effect on innovation also support the 
hypothesis that formal institutions protect copy rights of inventor and so it will be 
helpful in generation of new ideas and knowledge. 
Endogenous technological change model [Romer 1990)] indicates that research 
and development expenditures are positively related with development of new ideas and 
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technology. The claim of Romer (1990) is re-examined in various specifications and 
the  results show that  expenditures on R&D as percentage of GDP has a positive and  
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
 
 
  
Table 1
Impact of Institutions on Innovation Using Fixed Effect Method: Dependent Variable is Article Published (Overall Sample of Countries)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Article(-1) 0.770*** 0.705*** 0.763*** 0.734*** 0.705*** 0.668*** 0.566*** 0.721*** 0.702*** 0.728*** 0.704*** 0.699*** 0.697*** 0.579***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Formal Institutions 0.076*** 0.300
(0.014) (0.016)
Informal Institutions 6.034*** 5.416***
(0.333) (0.347)
Interaction 0.053*** 0.017*
(0.008) (0.009)
RD Expenditure 0.186*** 0.179*** 0.136*** 0.079*** 0.164*** 0.166*** 0.139*** 0.069***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023)
Trade Openness 0.222*** 0.108*** 0.111** 0.138*** 0.147*** 0.096*
(0.039) (0.040) (0.051) (0.044) (0.043) (0.052)
Human Capital 0.122*** 0.144*** 0.153*** 0.100***
(0.013) (0.017) (0.018) (0.021)
Internet User 0.003 0.024***
(0.005) (0.009)
Constant 0.541*** -8.053*** 0.597*** 1.216*** 1.487*** 0.540*** 0.758*** 1.072*** -7.106*** 1.069*** 1.099*** 1.514*** 0.103 0.890***
(0.078) (0.510) (0.074) (0.060) (0.076) (0.124) (0.165) (0.117) (0.540) (0.107) (0.083) (0.093) (0.188) (0.213)
Observations 2,039 1,857 1,618 2,193 2,193 2,193 1,539 2,039 1,857 1,618 2,193 2,193 2,193 1,539
R-squared 0.655 0.637 0.719 0.614 0.620 0.636 0.604 0.692 0.659 0.753 0.634 0.635 0.648 0.630
Number of c_no 70 60 57 68 68 68 68 70 60 57 68 68 68 68
Note: Dependent variable is Number of Articles published). Lagged Article (Articles Published (–1)) and other are treated as regressors. Period dummies are included but not reported.
Standard errors in parentheses and asterisk denote respectively *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 2
Impact of Institutions on Innovation Using System GMM: Dependent Variable is Article Published (Overall Sample of Countries)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
RD  Expenditures 0.110*** 0.0700*** 0.106*** 0.0545*** 0.0846*** 0.0928*** 0.0552*** 0.0711*** 0.0530*** 0.0523***
(0.0253) (0.0197) (0.037) (0.0148) (0.0233) (0.0176) (0.0144) (0.0161) (0.0138) (0.0143)
Articles  Published(–1) 0.917*** 0.910*** 0.907*** 0.871*** 0.869*** 0.871*** 0.876*** 0.875*** 0.859*** 0.873***
(0.0159) (0.0191) (0.023) (0.0173) (0.0242) (0.0163) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0191) (0.0185)
Informal  Institution Index 0.272*** 0.922*
(0.0521) (0.515)
Formal  Institution Index 0.0811*** 0.287**
(0.0172) (0.141)
Human Capital 0.0736*** 0.0653*** 0.0608*** 0.0696*** 0.0651*** 0.0790*** 0.0545***
(0.0103) (0.0138) (0.00876) (0.0109) (0.00967) (0.0110) (0.00939)
Interaction Term –1.226
(0.785)
Trade Openness 0.0717*
(0.0380)
Internet User 0.00521
(0.00763)
Gini Index 0.00214**
(0.000877)
Ethnic Fractionalisation –0.109*
(0.0632)
Muslims 0.000983**
(0.000449)
Catholic -0.00122***
(0.000385)
Other Religions 0.177**
(0.0762)
Observations 590 852 473 936 603 590 936 936 936 936
Number of c_no 34 41 43 47 43 34 47 47 47 47
AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.000 152.000 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) p-value 0.518 0.511 0.000 0.524 0.745 0.718 0.546 0.724 0.534 0.734
Sargen  p-value 1.000 0.922 0.711 0.677 0.434 0.0076 1.0000 0.789 0.976 0.789
Note: All specifications include time dummies. AR(1) and AR(2) are test of the 1st and 2nd order autocorrelation in the residual of difference equation respectively. Sargen P-value test
over-identification of exogenous variable. Robust standard error are in parentheses *, **, *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, 1 percent level respectively.
2
Table 3
Impact of Institutions on Innovation Using Fixed Effect Method: Dependent Variable is Article Published (Developed Countries)
Country Specific Effect Time Specific Fixed Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Article(–1) 0.754*** 0.682*** 0.763*** 0.661*** 0.626*** 0.387*** 0.688*** 0.664*** 0.703*** 0.657*** 0.658*** 0.393***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Formal Institutions 0.051*** -0.010
(0.011) (0.012)
Informal Institutions 6.128*** 5.398***
(0.325) (0.341)
Interaction 0.037*** 0.003
(0.007) (0.008)
RD Expenditure 0.208*** 0.166*** 0.143*** 0.184*** 0.158*** 0.135***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.024) (0.018) (0.019) (0.024)
Trade Openness 0.261*** 0.162*** 0.202*** 0.201*** 0.206*** 0.164***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.042) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043)
Human Capital 0.096*** 0.110*** 0.106*** 0.062***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016)
Internet User 0.011*** 0.047***
(0.004) (0.007)
Constant 0.855*** -8.061*** 0.808*** 1.798*** 1.056*** 2.019*** 1.493*** -6.885*** 1.395*** 1.603*** 0.819*** 2.065***
(0.071) (0.499) (0.071) (0.084) (0.124) (0.144) (0.102) (0.538) (0.104) (0.095) (0.150) (0.178)
Observations 1,652 1,584 1,416 1,799 1,799 1,273 1,652 1,584 1,416 1,799 1,799 1,273
R-squared 0.705 0.627 0.751 0.641 0.654 0.593 0.744 0.652 0.788 0.665 0.673 0.626
Number of c_no 56 48 48 55 55 55 56 48 48 55 55 55
Note: Dependent variable is Articles published. Lagged Articles Published (–1) and other are treated as regressors. Period dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors in
parentheses and asterisk denote respectively *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4
Impact Institutions on Innovation using SYS-GMM (Developed Countries): Dependent Variable is Article Published
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
RD Expenditures 0.0833*** 0.0387** 0.126*** 0.0489*** 0.0512** 0.114*** 0.0510*** 0.0591*** 0.0440*** 0.0422***
(0.0242) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0134) (0.0224) (0.0205) (0.0141) (0.0149) (0.0137) (0.0136)
Articles Published(-1) 0.931*** 0.951*** 0.896*** 0.904*** 0.936*** 0.869*** 0.905*** 0.901*** 0.896*** 0.891***
(0.0157) (0.0161) (0.0109) (0.0155) (0.0207) (0.0169) (0.0158) (0.0160) (0.0167) (0.0169)
Informal Institution Index 0.228***
(0.0519)
Formal Institution Index 0.0464***
(0.0144)
Human Capital 0.0528*** 0.0339*** 0.0630*** 0.0515*** 0.0521*** 0.0572*** 0.0446***
(0.00888) (0.0113) (0.00906) (0.00913) (0.00856) (0.00954) (0.00821)
Interaction Term -0.0539
(0.0482)
Openness 0.0281
(0.0222)
Internet User 0.00128
(0.00592)
Gini Index 0.00206**
(0.000860)
Ethnic Fractionalisation 0.0225
(0.0541)
Muslims 0.000588
(0.000397)
Catholic -0.00064**
(0.000326)
Other Religions 0.190***
(0.0596)
Observations 514 610 673 673 438 514 673 673 673 673
Number of c_no 29 31 37 37 33 29 37 37 37 37
AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) p-value 0.518 0.511 0.543 0.524 0.745 0.718 0.546 0.724 0.534 0.734
Sargan  p-value 1.0000 0.922 0.441 .677 0.434 0.0076 1.0000 0.789 0.976 0.789
Note: All specifications include time dummies. AR(1) and AR(2) are test of the 1st and 2nd order autocorrelation in the residual of difference equation respectively. Sargan P-value test
over identification of exogenous variable. Robust standard errors are in parentheses *, **, *** denote significance at 10 percent,5 percent,1 percent level respectively.
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Table 5
Impact of Institutions on Innovation Using Fixed Effect Method: Dependent Variable is Article Published (Developing Countries)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Article  Published(1) 0.786*** 0.749*** 0.760*** 0.784*** 0.768*** 0.718*** 0.666*** 0.666*** 0.775*** 0.714*** 0.711*** 0.713*** 0.719*** 0.644***
(0.033) (0.034) (0.042) (0.034) (0.037) (0.035) (0.039) (0.042) (0.038) (0.052) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.045)
Formal Institutions 0.151*** 0.034
(0.048) (0.070)
Informal Institution 5.915*** 4.519***
(1.319) (1.349)
Interaction 0.128*** 0.116**
(0.037) (0.052)
RD Expenditure 0.157*** 0.156*** 0.110*** 0.036 0.083** 0.083** 0.070* 0.020
(0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.054) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.053)
Trade Openness 0.126 -0.034
(0.108) (0.114)
Human Capital 0.238*** 0.295*** 0.282*** 0.240**
(0.042) (0.067) (0.072) (0.099)
Internet User 0.002 -0.068
(0.018) (0.044)
Constant –0.231 –8.131*** –0.333 0.759*** 0.905*** –0.711** –1.510*** 0.799* –7.205*** 1.196** –0.156 0.306 –1.152** 0.019
(0.192) (1.935) (0.208) (0.104) (0.163) (0.279) (0.562) (0.418) (1.985) (0.503) (0.238) (0.275) (0.582) (0.772)
Observations 387 273 202 394 394 394 266 387 273 202 394 394 394 266
R-squared 0.621 0.662 0.679 0.596 0.597 0.627 0.664 0.708 0.746 0.802 0.677 0.677 0.691 0.723
Number of c_no 14 12 9 13 13 13 13 14 12 9 13 13 13 13
Note: Dependent variable is Number of Articles published. Lagged Articles and other are treated as regressors. Period dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors are in
parentheses and asterisk denote respectively *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6
Impact of Institutions on Innovation Using System GMM: Dependent Variable is Article Published (Developing Countries)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
RD  Expenditures 0.108*** 0.0725** 0.130*** 0.0470* 0.0660* 0.116*** 0.0433* 0.0557** 0.0394 0.0451*
(0.0370) (0.0295) (0.0405) (0.0256) (0.0395) (0.0411) (0.0253) (0.0259) (0.0253) (0.0260)
Articles Published(-1) 0.825*** 0.836*** 0.890*** 0.842*** 0.783*** 0.815*** 0.850*** 0.826*** 0.839*** 0.849***
(0.0456) (0.0369) (0.0374) (0.0340) (0.0425) (0.0501) (0.0322) (0.0341) (0.0332) (0.0327)
Informal Institution 0.320***
(0.0870)
 Formal Institutions 0.109***
(0.0259)
Human Capital 0.0587*** 0.0562** 0.0286 0.0689*** 0.0665*** 0.0741*** 0.0579***
(0.0156) (0.0252) (0.0387) (0.0188) (0.0152) (0.0177) (0.0185)
Interaction Term 1.482***
(0.486)
Openness –0.0489
(0.0594)
Internet User 0.0368*
(0.0194)
Gini Index 0.0115
(0.00716)
Ethnic Fractionalisation 0.0917
(0.149)
Muslims Dummy 0.00212**
(0.00106)
catholic Dummy –0.00119
(0.000893)
Other religion Dummy 0.104
(0.287)
Observations 76 242 263 263 165 76 263 263 263 263
Number of c_no 5 10 10 10 10 5 10 10 10 10
AR(1) pvalue 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) pvalue 0.518 0.511 0.543 0.524 0.745 0.718 0.546 0.724 0.534 0.734
Sargan  p-value 1.000 0.922 0.441 .677 0.434 0.0076 1.0000 0.789 0.976 0.789
Note: All specifications include time dummies. AR(1) and AR(2) are test of the 1st and 2nd order autocorrelation in the residual of difference equation respectively. Sargan P-value test
over-identification of exogenous variable. Robust standard errors are in parentheses *, **, *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, 1 percent level respectively.
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a significant effect in all the specifications. Moreover, the Romer model also states that 
the number of researcher (skilled labour or human capital) also has a positive effect on 
new product variety development or new ideas development. In all specifications the 
coefficients of human capital show a positive and significant effect on innovation 
supporting Romer (1990). 
Trade openness indicators show positive significant effect on innovation in case of 
developed countries’ sample which confirms Grossman and Helpman (1990) conclusion. 
The positive effect of trade openness indicator implies that trade liberalisation can be 
used as mechanism of diffusion of technology in the world. In contrast to the developed 
countries, trade liberalisation shows positive insignificant effect on innovation and 
become negative insignificant when time effect is considered. 
The study also used system GMM to check the robustness of estimation result. The 
estimation result of system GMM shows a positive significant coefficient of past research 
work which implies that past innovations have a significant positive effect on current 
innovations. In base line specification, RD expenditures and past innovations show a 
positive significant effects on current innovations supporting RD growth models [Romer 
(1990); Hall and Jone (1991)]. 
The coefficient of informal institutions is positive significant in all specifications. 
The positive significant effect of informal institutions on innovation implies that 
innovations increase at workplace where social values prevail. The coefficient of formal 
institutions is positive significant which means that strong formal institutions create an 
incentive to innovate more (see Tables 2, 4, and 6). 
The empirical results concerning formal institutions’ effect on innovation 
also support our theoretical intuitions i.e. formal institutions protect copyright of 
researchers and so the existence of strong formal institutions helps in generation of 
new ideas and knowledge. This is the same result which full sample of countries 
shows. In contrast to developing countries, the coefficient of the interaction term is 
negative insignificant, which implies that formal institutions are complementary to 
informal institutions. The last result hints at capitalist nature of developed 
countries where informal networking is lacking. This result support Putnam (1990) 
finding that due to individualistic nature of people living in the developed 
countries, they lack social networking. Whereas the coefficient of interaction term 
is positive significant  in case of developing countries which implies that social 
values in the form of informal institution  support formal institutions in affecting 
innovative performance of the sampled countries. This hints at an interesting point 
that in order to increase innovative activities, developing countries should seek 
collaboration with developed countries in order to increase the stock of new ideas 
in those countries. 
The study considers the effect of formal and informal institution and examines the 
individual effect of internet users on the generation of new ideas. The study of the 
individual result of internet user shows insignificant positive effects of intent user on 
innovation. RD growth model [Romer (1990)] states that the number of researcher 
(skilled labour or human capital) also has a positive effect on development of new 
product varieties or generating new ideas.  In all specifications the coefficients of human 
capital show positive and significant effects on innovation. 
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The study also includes religions dummies and the results shows positive effect of 
Muslim dummy. Other religion dummy also shows significant positive (0.190***) effect 
on innovation while catholic dummy shows negative significant (–0.000640***) effect 
on innovation performance of developed countries (see Table 4). The result for 
developing countries shows that Muslims are more cooperative in sharing of knowledge 
as compared to other religions (see Table 6). The study also includes ethnicity as a 
dummy variable and the result shows positive insignificant effect on innovation. This 
shows that workers in workplace with heterogeneous workers would be able to create 
more ideas due to diversity in their specialisation. The coefficient of Gini index is 
positive which means that income inequality has a positive effect on innovation. This 
implies that workplace where each worker is paid to his/her contribution would 
experience an increase in innovative ideas (see Tables 4 and 6). 
The overall conclusion is that informal institutions, formal institutions, human 
capital, Research and development expenditure, Internet usage, and trade liberalisation 
have a positive effect on innovation. Muslim dummy and other religion dummy shows 
positive effect on innovation while catholic dummy shows negative effect on innovation.  
 
7.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This paper has attempted to analyse the effects of institutions, both formal and 
informal, on innovations in aggregate and disaggregate sample of countries. The 
assumption is that not only formal institutions, such as intellectual property right but 
informal institutions such as values, norms, traditions and religiosity affect innovation 
performance of sampled countries. Fixed effect method and system GMM are used for 
empirical analysis. Religion dummies are used as instrument of informal institutions. 
Empirical results of fixed effect method show that the research and development 
expenditures, stock of knowledge, human capital, and informal institutions and formal 
institution show significant positive effect on innovation in case of the full sample and the 
samples of developed countries and developing countries. However formal institutions are 
more effective in developed countries and informal institutions in developing countries. In 
contrast to institutions of developed countries, in developing countries institutions are found 
supplementary to each other. Muslims are found to have a significant positive effect on 
innovation in developing countries while other religion dummy is found to have positive 
significant effect on innovation in case of developed countries. 
Based on the  results, it is suggested that attention may focus  on informal 
institutions as these would strengthen formal institutions in developing countries. As 
formal institutions are found to be more effective in the developed countries, informal 
institutions need to be strengthened in developing countries in order to improve their 
innovative performance. In developing countries, organisation need to provide an 
environment in which workers could freely meet and share ideas with co-workers. The 
study concludes that collective work encourages innovation; therefore, governments of 
less developed countries should foster innovation activities in collaboration with 
industries, organisations and institutions of developed countries. To accelerate innovative 
activities, there is a need to encourage sharing of knowledge through better internet 
facilities, improved access to libraries and databases, and establishment of research 
infrastructure. 
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This paper can be extended by taking micro level study at organisation level to 
highlight the importance of institutions and its impact on innovation. Also this paper can 
be extended by taking individual measures of formal and informal institutions to examine 
its effect on innovation. 
 
Appendix 1 
List of Variables 
Income Group LowIncome-1, Lower middle Income-2 Upper Income-3 
HighIncom-4 
Data Sources 
Region Region1, Region 2, Region 3, Region 4,  Region 5, Region 6,   
Region 7 
WDI 
GDP Per Capita GDP per capita (current US$) WDI 
Article Scientific and technical journal articles. Number of scientific 
and engineering articles published in the following fields: 
physics, biology, chemistry, mathematics, clinical medicine, 
biomedical research, engineering and technology, and earth 
and space sciences, per million people 
World Bank; National Science 
Foundation, UNESCO 
 
RD Expenditures R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP OECD 
Openness Openness Indicator. (Import + Export)/GDP UNCTAD 
Human Capital Mean years of schooling. Average number of years of school 
completed in population over 14 
Barro and Lee (2001); World 
Bank 
Education 
Expenditures 
Public Expenditure on Education. Current and capital public 
expenditure on education 
UNESCO 
Internet User Internet users per 1000 people. People with access to the 
worldwide web network divided by the total amount of population. 
World Bank 
 
Corruption Index Corruption Perception Index. Transparency International Index, 
ranging from 0 (High Corruption) to 10 (Low Corruption) 
Transparency International 
Gini Gini Index  United Nations 
Family Important  Family important in life. Index ranging from 3 (very 
important) to 0 (not import 
World Values Survey 
Trust  Most people can be trusted. Percentage of respondents who 
“agree” with this stat 
World Values Survey 
Happiness Feeling of Happiness. Index ranging from 3 (very happy) to 0 
(not happy). 
World Values Survey 
School Friendship Friends important in life. Index ranging from 3 (very 
important) to 0 (not important) 
World Values Survey 
Informal 
Institutions Index  
Informal institutions Index is the average value of Trust, 
Happiness and  School Friendship variables 
Author own calculation 
Government 
Stability 
A measure of both of the government’s ability to carry out its 
declared program(s), and its ability to stay in office. The risk 
rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents: 
Government Unity, Legislative Strength, and Popular Support 
ICRG 
Socio-economic 
Conditions 
A measure of the socioeconomic pressures at work in society that 
could constrain government action or fuel social dissatisfaction. 
The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents: 
Unemployment, Consumer Confidence, and Poverty 
ICRG 
Investment Profile A measure of the factors affecting the risk to investment that 
are not covered by other political, economic and financial risk 
components. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three 
subcomponents: Contract Viability/Expropriation, Profits 
Repatriation, and Payment Delays 
ICRG 
Corruption A measure of corruption within the political system that is 
threat to foreign investment by distorting the economic and 
financial environment, reducing the efficacy of government 
and business by enabling people to assume position of power 
through patronage rather than ability, and introducing inherent 
instability into the political process 
ICRG 
Law and Order Two measures comprising one risk component. Each sub-
component equals half of the total. The “law” sub-component 
assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system, and the 
"order" sub-component assesses popular observance of the law 
ICRG 
Continued— 
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Appendix Table I—( Continued) 
Ethnic Tensions A measure of the degree of tension attributable to 
racial, national, or language divisions. Lower ratings 
(higher risk) are given to countries where tensions are 
high because opposing groups are intolerant and 
unwilling to compromise 
ICRG 
Democratic 
Accountability 
A measure of, not just whether there are free and 
fair election, but how responsive government is to 
its people. The less responsive it is, the more likely 
it will fall. Even democratically elected 
government can delude themselves into thinking 
they know what is best for the people, regardless of  
clear indication to the contrary from the people 
ICRG 
Bureaucracy 
Quality 
Institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is 
a shock absorber that tends to minimise revisions of 
policy when governments change. In low-risk 
countries, the bureaucracy is somewhat autonomous 
from political pressure 
ICRG 
Formal Institution 
Index  
Informal institutions index is the average value of i) 
Government Stability ii) Investment Profile iii) Control 
over Corruption iv) Law and Order v) Democratic 
Accountability  and vi) Bureaucracy Quality 
Author own calculation 
Settler Mortality Log of the mortality rate faced by European settlers at 
the time of colonisation 
The Quality of Government Institute, 
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se 
Ethnic 
Fractionalisation 
The variables reflect the probability that two 
randomly selected people from a given country will 
not share a certain characteristic, the higher the 
number the less probability of the two sharing that 
characteristic 
The Quality of Government Institute, 
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se 
Linguistic 
Fractionalisation 
 Reflects probability that two randomly selected people 
from a given country will not belong to the same 
linguistic group. The higher the number, the more 
fractionalised society 
The Quality of Government Institute, 
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se 
Religious 
fractionalisation 
Reflects probability that two randomly selected people 
from a given country will not belong to the same 
religious group. The higher the number, the more 
fractionalised society 
The Quality of Government Institute, 
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se 
Colonial This is a tenfold classification of the former colonial 
ruler of the country. 0=never,1= Dutch,2= Spanish,(3) 
Italian,(4) US,(5) British,(6) French, (7) Portuguese (8) 
Belgian (9) British-French (10) Australian 
The Quality of Government Institute, 
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se 
Catholics Catholics as percentage of population in 1980 The Quality of Government Institute, 
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se 
Muslims Muslims as percentage of population in 1980 The Quality of Government Institute, 
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se 
Other Religion: Other Denomination The Quality of Government Institute, 
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se 
Population Density Population density (people per sq. km of land area) WDI 
Population Growth Population growth (annual %) WDI 
Death Rate Death rate, crude (per 1,000 people) World Bank 
Distance Distance to frontier score (0=lowest performance to 
100=frontier) 
World Bank 
Droughts  World Bank 
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Appendix 2 
 Names of Countries, Regions and Groups 
Country No. Country Name Regions Income Group 
1 Algeria Middle East and North Africa Upper Middle income 
2 Argentina Latin America and Caribbean Upper Middle income 
3 Armenia Europe and Central Asia lower middle income 
4 Australia East Asia and Pacific High-income OECD 
5 Austria Europe and Central Asia High-income OECD 
6 Azerbaijan Europe and Central Asia Upper Middle income 
7 Bangladesh South Asia Low Income 
8 Belgium Europe and Central Asia High-income OECD 
9 Bolivia Latin America and Caribbean lower middle income 
10 Botswana Sub-Saharan Africa Upper Middle income 
11 Brazil Latin America and Caribbean Upper Middle income 
12 Bulgaria Europe and Central Asia Upper Middle income 
13 Canada North America High-income OECD 
14 Chile Latin America and Caribbean High-income OECD 
15 China East Asia and Pacific Upper Middle income 
16 Colombia Latin America and Caribbean Upper Middle income 
17 Costa Rica Latin America and Caribbean Upper Middle income 
18 Croatia Europe and Central Asia High Income non-OECD 
19 Czech Republic Europe and Central Asia High-income OECD 
20 Denmark Europe and Central Asia High-income OECD 
21 Dominican Republic Middle East and North Africa Upper Middle income 
22 Ecuador Latin America and Caribbean Upper Middle income 
23 Egypt Middle East and North Africa lower middle income 
24 El Salvador Latin America and Caribbean lower middle income 
25 Finland Europe and Central Asia High-income OECD 
26 France Europe and Central Asia High-income OECD 
27 Georgia Europe and Central Asia lower middle income 
28 Germany Europe and Central Asia High-income OECD 
29 Greece Europe and Central Asia High-income OECD 
30 Honduras Latin America and Caribbean lower middle income 
31 Hungary Europe and Central Asia Upper Middle income 
32 India South Asia lower middle income 
33 Indonesia East Asia and Pacific lower middle income 
34 Iran Middle East and North Africa Upper Middle income 
35 Ireland Europe and Central Asia High-income OECD 
36 Israel Middle East and North Africa High-income OECD 
37 Italy Europe and Central Asia High-income OECD 
38 Jamaica Latin America and Caribbean Upper Middle income 
39 Japan East Asia and Pacific High-income OECD 
40 Malaysia East Asia and Pacific Upper Middle income 
41 Mauritius Sub-Saharan Africa Upper Middle income 
42 Mexico Latin America and Caribbean Upper Middle income 
43 Moldova Europe and Central Asia lower middle income 
44 Netherlands Europe and Central Asia High-income OECD 
45 New Zealand East Asia and Pacific High-income OECD 
46 Nicaragua Latin America and Caribbean lower middle income 
47 Norway Europe and Central Asia High-income OECD 
48 Pakistan South Asia lower middle income 
49 Panama Latin America and Caribbean Upper Middle income 
50 Paraguay Latin America and Caribbean lower middle income 
51 Peru Latin America and Caribbean Upper Middle income 
52 Poland Europe and Central Asia High-income OECD 
53 Portugal Europe and Central Asia High-income OECD 
54 Romania Europe and Central Asia Upper Middle income 
55 Russia Europe and Central Asia High Income non-OECD 
56 Singapore East Asia and Pacific High Income non-OECD 
57 Slovakia Europe and Central Asia High-income OECD 
58 Slovenia Europe and Central Asia High-income OECD 
59 South Africa Europe and Central Asia Upper Middle income 
60 Spain Europe and Central Asia High-income OECD 
61 Sri Lanka South Asia lower middle income 
62 Sweden Europe and Central Asia High-income OECD 
63 Switzerland Europe and Central Asia High-income OECD 
64 Thailand East Asia and Pacific Upper Middle income 
65 Trinidad and Tobago Latin America and Caribbean High Income non-OECD 
66 Tunisia Middle East and North Africa Upper Middle income 
67 Turkey Europe and Central Asia Upper Middle income 
68 Ukraine Europe and Central Asia lower middle income 
69 United Kingdom Europe and Central Asia High-income OECD 
70 United States North America High-income OECD 
71 Uruguay Latin America and Caribbean High Income non-OECD 
72 Venezuela Latin America and Caribbean Upper Middle income 
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